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All Rights Reserved. OSO version 0. University Press Scholarship Online. Sign in. Not registered? Sign up. Publications Pages Publications Pages. The dialectic is also a virtue developer. Through practicing the dialectic, philosophers develop intellectual virtues such as episteme —see Sect. Plato never discusses the exact nature of the dialectic in detail see e.
Still, we learn in Book VII of the Republic that it involves the ability to give account of the nature of each thing and to ask and answer questions with the highest degree of clarity The dialectic is a purely rational method that leads to intellectual success:. It is of course an intellectual theme, but can be represented in terms of vision, as we said, the progress of sight from shadows to the real creatures themselves, and then to the starts themselves, and finally to the sun itself.
So when one tries to get at what each thing is in itself by the exercise of dialectic, relying on reason without any aid from the senses, and refuses to give up until he has grasped by pure thought what the good is in itself, one is at the summit of the intellectual realm, as the man who has looked at the sun was of the visual real. The dialectic is a system of success that leads to episteme. However, agents first need to be trained in the dialectical method before being able to employ it with success in their pursuit of intellectual ends.
Agents are not born possessing fully-fledged rational desires or knowing how to acquire intellectual goods through the method of the dialectic. The dialectic, which is the cornerstone of the Platonic educational regime, enables philosophers to develop intellectual virtues to their fullest and be reliably successful at reaching the objects of their rational desires. Footnote 7. Overall, I have argued that both the success and the motivational component of intellectual virtues can be found in the Platonic corpus.
I will now proceed to argue that Plato considers episteme to be the primary intellectual virtue. Plato, in many of his dialogues, discusses the concept of episteme. Episteme is commonly translated as knowledge Footnote 8 ; and we learn from Platonic dialogues, such as the Republic e. V, a and the Phaedrus e.
Still, as I am going to show to have episteme , one must not simply have knowledge of the Forms; one must have understanding of them. As I have already argued, rational desires satisfy the motivational component of intellectual virtues. The objects of these rational desires are epistemic goods such as knowledge, truth and wisdom see for example, Rep.
Still, for Plato, the ultimate object of rational desires is episteme of the Forms. According to Plato, Forms are the true object of epistemic inquiry and it is only those following that pursuit who should be called philosophers.
Footnote 9 Plato makes this point abundantly clear in the Republic :. Philosophers, in order to acquire episteme of the Forms the object of their rational desires , practice the dialectic. Episteme involves a motivational component rational desires to acquire episteme of the Forms and a success component dialecticians are reliably successful at acquiring episteme of the Forms through the dialectic. Thus, the Platonic conception of episteme satisfies both building blocks of the concept of intellectual virtues identified by contemporary scholars such as Zagzebski Still, episteme , although commonly translated as knowledge, is closer to the contemporary conception of understanding.
Pritchard identifies three value problems for knowledge. Footnote 10 He argues that if one were to tackle successfully these three problems, one would show that knowledge is finally valuable. According to Pritchard, the primary value problem is showing why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief Ibid. The secondary value problem is showing why knowledge is more valuable than what falls short of knowledge Ibid.
Lastly, the tertiary value problem is the need to explain why knowledge has a different kind of value than whatever falls short of knowledge Ibid. In order to answer these three value problems, Pritchard goes on to develop a new theory which he calls anti-luck virtue epistemology see also Pritchard , and argues that this approach can provide answers to the primary and secondary value problems of knowledge.
However, he also argues that epistemic luck and knowledge acquired by testimony undermine the position of robust virtue epistemology that knowledge has final value , p. Therefore, Pritchard rejects the argument that knowledge has final value on the basis that it is not a cognitive achievement. He argues that final value comes from achievements that are the result of ability, where the success in question either involves the overcoming of a significant obstacle or the exercise of a significant level of ability Ibid.
Still, Pritchard argues that understanding, which is distinct from knowledge, is a form of cognitive achievement and therefore finally valuable Footnote 11 Ibid. According to him, understanding is both factive and resistant to epistemic luck Ibid. In order to explain his conception of understanding and how it differs from knowledge, Pritchard gives the example of the burned house Ibid. According to Pritchard, for someone to understand, and not simply know, that a house burned down due to faulty wiring, one must have a conception of how faulty wiring could cause the fire thus, for Prichard, understanding involves explanatory connections Footnote Yet, a kid may know that a house burned down due to faulty wiring, if for example her parents tell her so.
However, the kid does not have understanding, because she has no conception of how faulty wiring could do this. Footnote Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things the horseman? Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true episteme ea.
He has to rely on the user in the same way that the child has to rely on her parents. The maker knows how to make the bridle but not why it has to be made in a specific way. Footnote 15 It is only the horseman who has understanding of why the bridle ought to be made in a specific way that has episteme.
Plato uses the knowledge of letters as a model of the knowledge of the Forms see for example Theaetetus c4—c5. Forms or Kinds, can be exhibited in a systematic body of theory. This, however, goes beyond the modern conception of knowledge; it involves a kind of understanding. One also needs to understand how the Forms are interrelated in order to have episteme. So you would agree in calling the ability to give an account of the essential nature of each particular thing Dialectic; and in saying that anyone who is unable to give such an account of things either to himself or to other people has to that extent failed to understand them.
Any notion such a man has is based on opinion rather than episteme, and he is living in a dream from which he is unlikely to awake this side of the grave, where he will finally sleep for ever b-c. It is evident from the above passage of the Republic that the dialecticians can give an account of the being of each thing and also display its relation to the first principle i.
It involves displaying its relation to a first principle—it involves explanatory connections. The philosophers, on the other hand, give an account of something by displaying its relation to the first principle—they can explain why. Still, Pritchard argues that understanding is finally valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. This is especially evident in the Republic.
According to Plato, in order for an agent to reach an understanding of the Forms, one has to undergo the entire educational program that Plato describes in the Republic VII, d—c.
Reaching an understanding of the Forms and the Form of the good is the most important and valuable human endeavor; it is a cognitive achievement that requires agents to dedicate their whole lives in this rational pursuit. One cannot reach an understanding of the Forms either by luck Footnote 16 or by the testimony of others. However, the strongest evidence showing that for Plato episteme is a cognitive achievement is that philosophers must move from hypothesizing Footnote 17 to the first principle.
According to Socrates, the hypothetical method is second best to a teleological account Rep. This move to the first principle, which yields episteme , cannot be achieved either by luck or by testimony—the two reasons why Pritchard , p. Overall, I have shown in this section that Plato considers episteme as the primary intellectual virtue. Footnote 18 The Platonic concept of episteme involves a motivational component philosophers ultimately desire to acquire episteme of the Forms , a success component philosophers are reliably successful at acquiring episteme of the Forms through the dialectic and is a cognitive achievement that aims at what is finally valuable.
Now that I have outlined the most significant indications viz. I begin this section by highlighting certain fundamental differences between the Platonic and the Aristotelian conceptions of virtue in what regards the relationship of moral and intellectual virtues. In the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle draws a clear distinction between moral and intellectual virtues both in what concerns their function and in what concerns the methods through which agents develop them.
He argues that there are two parts in the human soul: the intellect, which has reason in the full sense, and the appetitive, which is responsive to reason EN , b13— Moreover, he argues that intellectual virtues owe their growth to teaching EN , a14—15 , while moral virtues are acquired through a process of habituation and mimesis EN , ab5.
According to Aristotle, the two primary intellectual virtues are philosophical wisdom sophia and practical wisdom phronesis. Practical wisdom involves an awareness of the particulars while philosophical wisdom involves the highest objects of knowledge which are not human affairs EN , b1—7. In contrast to Aristotle, Plato does not draw such a sharp distinction between moral and intellectual virtues.
For example, in his account of the four cardinal virtues in the Republic IV, e—b , wisdom Footnote 21 sophia is listed besides justice, courage and temperance. Plato does not treat wisdom any differently than the other three virtues in the sense that he does not ascribe to it elements that would identify it as a virtue that has no moral applications as for example Aristotle does in his description of sophia.
According to Plato, wisdom entails both theoretical and practical elements. This is evident from the fact that philosophers have to hold offices to help the city-state with practical issues, and are best suited to do so because of the understanding of the Forms—and most crucially of the Form of the good—they have acquired through the dialectic Rep.
For Plato, the source of moral and intellectual virtues is the same, viz. Also, unlike Aristotle, Plato thought that the method for developing moral virtues does not differ from the method for developing intellectual ones.
For an agent to be truly virtuous morally and intellectually , they need to have acquired an understanding of the Forms and the Form of the good through the dialectic i. It is only those agents who have reached understanding of the Forms that are truly, both morally and intellectually, virtuous Rep.
Contra Aristotle, Zagzebski does not differentiate intellectual virtues from moral, considering them all to be part of virtue ethics. In fact, scholars such as MacAllister have criticized Zagzebski for labelling her theory Neo-Aristotelian given that she clearly deviates from the Aristotelian position on such a fundamental topic as the relationship of moral and intellectual virtues.
I believe that her theory is much closer to the Platonic conception of virtue than is to the Aristotelian. Plato, similarly to Zagzebski and unlike Aristotle , also does not differentiate between intellectual and moral virtues, at least not to such a large extent as Aristotle does.
It is most likely the case that Zagzebski does not use the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues as the starting point for her theory simply because she is unaware of its existence. Instead, Socrates points out the role they play in the maintenance of the social order.
The third class, then, has no specific virtue of its own. But since Socrates does not elaborate on the dispositions of justice and moderation any further, there seems to be only a fine line between the functions of justice and moderation in the city. That there are four virtues rather than three probably also reflects the fact that this catalogue of four was a fixture in tradition. As will emerge in connection with the virtues in the individual soul, the distinction between justice and moderation is far less problematic in the case of the individual than in that of the city as a whole, because in the individual soul, internal self-control and external self-restraint are clearly different attitudes.
As this survey shows, the virtues are no longer confined to knowledge. They also contain right beliefs and attitudes of harmony and compliance — extensions that are apt to make up for deficiencies in the explanation of certain virtues in earlier dialogues.
The promise to establish the isomorphic structure of the city and soul has not been forgotten. After the definition and assignment of the four virtues to the three classes of the city, the investigation turns to the role and function of the virtues in the soul.
The soul is held to consist of three parts , corresponding to the three classes in the city. Indeed, there is no indication of separate parts of the soul in any of the earlier dialogues; irrational desires are attributed to the influence of the body.
In the Republic , by contrast, the soul itself becomes the source of the appetites and desires. The difference between the rational and the appetitive part is easily justified, because the opposition between the decrees of reason and the various kinds of unreasonable desires is familiar to everyone d—e.
But the phenomenon of moral indignation is treated as evidence for a psychic force that is reducible neither to reason nor to any of the appetites; it is rather an ally of reason in a well-ordered soul, a force opposed to unruly appetites e—c.
This concludes the proof that there are three parts in the soul corresponding to the three classes in the city — namely the rational part in the wisdom of the rulers, the spirited part, which is manifested in the courage of the soldiers, the appetitive part, which is manifested in the rest of the population, whose defining motivation is material gain. This presupposes that the two upper parts have been given the right kind of training and education in order to control the appetitive part d—a.
The three other virtues are then assigned to the respective parts of the soul. Courage is the excellence of the spirited part, wisdom belongs to the rational part, and moderation is the consent of all three about who should rule and who should obey. Justice turns out to be the overall unifying quality of the soul c—e. For, the just person not only refrains from meddling with what is not his, externally, but also harmonizes the three parts of the soul internally.
While justice is order and harmony, injustice is its opposite: it is a rebellion of one part of the city or soul against the others, and an inappropriate rule of the inferior parts. Justice and injustice in the soul are, then, analogous to health and illness in the body.
This comparison suffices to bring the investigation to its desired result. If justice is health and harmony of the soul, then injustice must be disease and disorder. Hence, it is clear that justice is a good state of the soul that makes its possessor happy, and injustice is its opposite. Just as no-one in his right mind would prefer to live with a ruined body so no-one would prefer to live with a diseased soul.
In principle, the discussion of justice has therefore reached its promised goal at the end of Book IV. That the discussion does not end here but occupies six more books, is due most of all to several loose ends that need to be tied up. This gap will be filled, at least in part, by the description of the communal life without private property and family in Book V. More importantly, nothing has been said about the rulers and their particular kind of knowledge.
A short summary of the upshot of the educational program must suffice here. The future philosophers, both women and men, are selected from the group of guardians whose general cultural training they share.
If they combine moral firmness with quickness of mind, they are subject to a rigorous curriculum of higher learning that will prepare them for the ascent from the world of the senses to the world of intelligence and truth, an ascent whose stages are summed up in the similes of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave a—b. This study is to last for another five years. Successful candidates are then sent back into the Cave as administrators of ordinary political life for about 15 years.
At the age of fifty the rulers are granted the pursuit of philosophy, an activity that is interrupted by periods of service as overseers of the order of the state.
That is no mean feat in a society where external and civil wars were a constant threat, and often enough ended in the destruction of the entire city. That human beings find, or at least try to find, satisfaction in the kinds of goods they cherish is a point further pursued in the depiction of the decay of the city and its ruling citizens, from the best — the aristocracy of the mind — down to the worst — the tyranny of lust, in Books VIII and IX.
A discussion of the tenability of this explanation of political and psychological decadence will not be attempted here. It is supposed to show that all inferior forms of government of city and soul are doomed to fail because of the inherent tensions between the goods that are aimed for. He clearly goes on the assumption that human beings are happy insofar as they achieve the goals they cherish. Why, then, reduce the third class to animal-like creatures with low appetites, as suggested by the comparison of the people to a strong beast that must be placated a—c?
This comparison is echoed later in the comparison of the soul to a multiform beast, where reason just barely controls the hydra-like heads of the appetites, and then only with the aid of a lion-like spirit c—d.
Is Plato thereby giving vent to anti-democratic sentiments, showing contempt for the rabble, as has often been claimed? Plato seems to sidestep his own insight that all human beings have an immortal soul and have to take care of it as best they can, as he not only demands in the Phaedo but is going to confirm in a fanciful way in the Myth of Er at the end of Republic Book X.
The life-style designated for the upper classes also seems open to objections. Theirs is an austere camp-life; not all of them will be selected for higher education. Their intellectual pursuits are also not entirely enviable, as a closer inspection would show.
This is indicated in the injunctions concerning the study of astronomy and harmonics a—d. The universe is not treated as an admirable cosmos, with the explicit purpose of providing moral and intellectual support to the citizens, in the way Plato is going to state in the Timaeus and in the Laws.
The system resembles a well-oiled machine where everyone has their appointed function and economic niche; but its machine-like character seems repellent, given that no deviations are permitted from the prescribed pattern. If innovations are forbidden, no room seems to be left for creativity and personal development. It states that every object, animal, and person has a specific function or work ergon.
His aim is rather more limited: He wants to present a model , and to work out its essential features. Rather, he wants to explain the generation and decay typical of each political system and the psychopathology of its leaders. It is unlikely that Plato presupposes that there are pure representatives of these types, though some historical states may have come closer to being representatives than others.
Was Plato aware of the fact that his black-and-white picture of civic life in his model state disregards the claim of individuals to have their own aims and ends, and not to be treated like automata, with no thoughts and wishes of their own? These works are the Symposium and the Phaedrus.
For though each dialogue should be studied as a unity of its own, it is also necessary to treat the individual dialogues as part of a wider picture. The Symposium and the Phaedrus are two dialogues that focus on the individual soul and pay no attention to communal life at all.
Instead, they concentrate on self-preservation, self-improvement, and self-completion. The Symposium is often treated as a dialogue that predates the Republic , most of all because it mentions neither the immortality nor the tripartition of the soul.
But its dramatic staging — the praise of Eros by a company of symposiasts — is not germane to the otherworldly and ascetic tendencies of the Gorgias and the Phaedo.
Contrary to all other speakers, Socrates denies that Eros is a god, because the gods are in a state of perfection. Love, by contrast, is a desire of the needy for the beautiful and the good c—c.
Human beings share that demonic condition; for they are neither good nor bad, but desire the good and the beautiful, the possession of which would constitute happiness for them. Because all people want happiness, they pursue the good as well as they can a—b. In each case they desire the particular kinds of objects that they hope will fulfill their needs.
And this is possible in one way only: by reproduction, because it leaves behind a new young one in place of the old. In the case of human beings this need expresses itself in different ways. Starting with the love of one beautiful body, the individual gradually learns to appreciate not only all physical beauty, but also the beauty of the mind, and in the end she gets a glimpse of the supreme kind of beauty, namely the Form of the Beautiful itself — a beauty that is neither relative, nor changeable, nor a matter of degree.
There is no talk of a painful liberation from the bonds of the senses, or of a turn-around of the entire soul that is reserved only for the better educated. Second, this drive finds its expression in the products of their work, in creativity.
There is no indication that individuals must act as part of a community. Though the communitarian aspect of the good and beautiful comes to the fore in the high praise of the products of the legendary legislators e—a , the ultimate assent to the Beautiful itself is up to the individual.
The Lysis shares its basic assumption concerning the intermediary state of human nature between good and bad, and regards need as the basis of friendship. The idea that eros is the incentive to sublimation and self-completion is worked out further in the Phaedrus. Although the close relationship between the two dialogues is generally acknowledged, the Phaedrus is commonly regarded as a much later work.
But this difference seems due to a difference in perspective rather than to a change of mind. The discussion in the Symposium is deliberately confined to the conditions of self-immortalization in this life, while the Phaedrus takes the discussion beyond the confines of this life. They explain, rather, the different routes taken by individuals in their search for beauty and their levels of success.
The misuse of rhetoric is exemplified by the speech attributed to the orator Lysias, a somewhat contrived plea to favor a non-lover rather than a lover. Once restored to his senses the lover will shun his former beloved and break all his promises. To explain the nature of this madness, Socrates employs the comparison of the tripartite soul to a charioteer with a pair winged horses, an obedient white one and an unruly black one.
That is what first makes the soul grow wings and soar in the pursuit of a corresponding deity, to the point where it may attain godlike insights. The best-conditioned souls — those where the charioteer has full control over his horses — get a glimpse of true being, including the nature of the virtues and of the good c—e. Depending on the quality of each soul, the quality of the beauty pursued will also determine the cycle of reincarnations that is in store for each soul after death c—c.
The individual does not find her or his fulfillment in peaceful interactions in a harmonious community. Instead, life is spent in the perennial pursuit of the higher and better. But in that task the individual is not alone; she shares that task with kindred spirits.
The message of the the Symposium and the Phaedrus is therefore two-pronged. On the one hand, there is no permanent attainment of happiness as a stable state of completion in this life. In the ups and downs of life and of the afterlife , humans are in constant need of beauty as an incentive to aim for their own completion. Humans are neither god-like nor wise; at best, they are god-lovers and philosophers, demonic hunters for truth and goodness.
To know is not to have; and to have once is not to have forever. In the Symposium , Diotima states in no uncertain terms that humans have a perennial need to replenish what they lose, both in body and soul, because they are mortal and changeable creatures, and the Phaedrus confirms the need for continued efforts, for the heavenly voyage is not a one-time affair. On the other hand, the second part of he message conveyed is that the pursuit of the good and the beautiful is not a lonely enterprise.
As the Phaedrus makes clear, love for a beautiful human being is an incentive to search for a higher form of life, as a sacred joint journey of two friends in communion a—e.
Sober philosophers have a tendency to ignore such visionary talk as too elevated and lacking in substance to be worth serious thought. Artful speaking and even artful deception presupposes knowledge of the truth, especially where the identity of the phenomena is difficult to grasp, because similarities can be deceptive.
This applies in particular to concepts like the good and the just, as witnessed by the wide disagreement about their nature a—c. That dialectic is geared to this end is somewhat obscured in the subsequent discussion in the Phaedrus. First of all, Plato turns away from this issue in his long depiction of the iniquities of contemporary rhetoricians, when he constrasts their efforts with scientific rhetoric.
Second, although Plato makes ample use of the method of collection and division in later dialogues such as the Sophist and the Statesman , he seems to pay little heed to problems of ethics, with the exception of the Philebus. That the Good is nowhere subjected to such treatment must be due to the enormity of the task involved in undertaking a systematic identification of all that is good, and in distinguishing good things from each other, as well as from the Form of the Good. As a closer look at the much later Philebus will show, the determination of what is good about each kind of thing presupposes more than a classification by collection and division.
For in addition, the internal structure of each kind of entity has to be determined. But as the late dialogues show, it took him quite some effort to develop the requisite conceptual tools for such analyses. Before we turn to the late dialogues, a final review is in order of the kind of good life Plato envisages in the dialogues under discussion here. This is what the scala amoris is all about. Just as in the Symposium , the philosophical life is deemed the best.
But then, this preference is found everywhere in Plato and itis not unique to him: all ancient philosophers regard their own occupation as the true fulfillment of human life. If there are differences between them, they concern the kinds of study and occupation that are deemed appropriate to philosophy.
They may be complementary, rather than rival, points of view, and no fixed chronology need be assumed in order to accommodate both.
Nature and natural things are not among the objects that concern Plato in his earlier and middle philosophical investigations. Thus, in the Republic , he dismisses the study of the visible heaven from the curriculum of higher learning along with audible music. What he denigrates is not the study of the heavenly order as such, nor that of harmonics; it is rather the extent to which we must necessarily rely on our eyes and ears in those concerns.
Students of philosophy are, rather, encouraged to work out the true intelligible order underlying the visible heaven and audible music. If Plato is critical of natural science, it is because of its empirical approach. Plato did not attempt to state how such a principle of goodness works in all things when he wrote the Republic. The stringency of these inferences is far from obvious; but they show that Plato saw an intimate connection between the nature, the function, and the well-being of all things, including human beings.
In the Republic , this question is answered only indirectly through the isomorphism of the just state and soul as a harmonious internal order. The postulate of such an orderly structure is not explicitly extended beyond the state and the soul. In contrast, in the later dialogues, the Good clearly operates on a cosmic scale.
What actions and passions properly belong to human nature and distinguish it from all other beings? If, in the Republic , the goodness of the individual soul is explained in terms of its being a smaller copy of a harmonious society, in the Timaeus , Plato goes for a larger model. The structure of the world-soul is replicated in the nature of the human soul. Yu, lecture notes, Plato said that the same issue is occurring within our own souls.
The number one corruption amongst the citizens of Greece, according to Plato, was adultery, followed by money at number two, and social networks at number three. Yu, lecture notes, This corruption begins with a lack of virtue. Yu, lecture notes, Plato says that the ruling class has wisdom, the guardians have courage, and the working class has moderation by being obedient of the ruling class then, have justice and injustice.
Yu, lecture notes, Plato also says that in order to have all four virtues, you must control the parts of your soul and let the rational part be the ruler, or else you will become corrupt.
Yu, lecture notes, The most conflicts of your soul develop from your appetitive, where the thing you desire is itself a desire for its simplicity.
Yu, lecture notes, For example, thirst itself is a desire for drinking simplicite, in other words, you will drink whatever is available whether it be wine or water. However, Plato then argues that once what we desire is a qualified drink, your thirst becomes a qualified desire, for instance, you will be thirsty for a particular drink such as wine and no other drink will satisfy your desire.
Yu lecture notes, This part of the soul is the irrational side and it is the driving force behind some of our not-so-great motives. Our rational desires often conflicts with our appetitive or irrational desires and sometimes we have opposite or contrary desires at the same time.
Yu, lecture notes, For example, the irrational part an individual may want to go out to a party the night before a test to relieve their stress and blow-off some steam, but the rational part of the same person may opt to stay in for the night and study instead to help their chances of getting a better grade. The third division of the soul, the spirit, is our emotions. Yu, lecture, notes Our spirit has no rational calculation, therefore it cannot be rational or irrational, it simply is composed of our anger, sadness, fear, and other emotional that are simply inevitable.
Yu, lecture notes, For example, a child can have anger or sadness, but it is not due to a rational calculation, it is merely an emotion that surfaces. Back to the Four Cardinal Virtues, Plato said that in order to have all four virtues, one must let the rational part of their soul rule over the others. The rational soul must be our wisdom, our spirit must be courageous, and we must be moderate of our appetitive.
This argument was somewhat influential amongst the Greek polis. Some of the not-so-successful arguments within this are when Plato attempts to stop our corruptions, sex, money, and social networks, through three different solutions. Yu, lecture notes, To prevent adultery, Plato suggested that society have a common wife system, legally binding marriage. Yu, lecture notes, To prevent corruption regarding money, Plato simply suggested that money itself should not be touched and no one should give or get money.
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